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Abstract
De se beliefs typically pose a problem for propositional theories of con-
tent. The Property Theory of content tries to overcome the problem of 
de se beliefs by taking properties to be the objects of our beliefs. I argue 
that the concept of self-ascription plays a crucial role in the Property 
Theory while being virtually unexplained. I then offer different pos-
sibilities of illuminating that concept and argue that the most common 
ones are either circular, question-begging, or epistemically problem-
atic. Finally, I argue that only a primitive understanding of self-ascrip-
tion is viable. Self-ascription is the relation that subjects stand in with 
respect to the properties that they believe themselves to have. As such, 
self-ascription has to be primitive if it is supposed to do justice to the 
characteristic features of de se beliefs.
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1 Introducing the problem of de se beliefs
De se beliefs are beliefs about oneself such as My legs are crossed which 
are typically expressed in language using the first-person pronoun. 
As such, de se beliefs are different from other beliefs about oneself 
such as Valentina Tereshkova believing of herself The first woman in 
space is brave. Furthermore, de se beliefs come with specific features 
such as their connection to self-knowledge, intentional action, per-
ception and other first-personal phenomena. Now, the problem of 
de se beliefs is to differentiate clearly between de se beliefs and other 
beliefs that subjects have about themselves. This enterprise proved 
especially problematic in classical theories of propositional con-
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tent such as the so-called ‘Doctrine of Propositions’ (cf. Castañeda 
1999a; Perry 1979), which can be characterised by two features that 
are relevant here:
(1) Belief is a relation between a subject and an object/content.
(2) The object of a belief is a proposition with an invariable truth-
value.1
The question for the proponent of the Doctrine then is: can we ac-
commodate de se beliefs with all their characteristics within the Doc-
trine? David Lewis argues in his ‘Attitudes De Dicto and De Se’ (1979) 
that this is not possible because a problem arises for the Doctrine 
from endorsing feature (2). If we take propositions with invariable 
truth-values as the objects of beliefs, we are incapable of distinguish-
ing between a subject believing something of herself in the de se way 
and her believing something of herself in the non-de se way. He force-
fully illustrates this problem in his well-known case of the two gods:
Consider the case of the two gods. They inhabit a certain possible 
world, and they know exactly which world it is. Therefore they know 
every proposition that is true at their world. Insofar as knowledge is a 
propositional attitude, they are omniscient. Still I can imagine them to 
suffer ignorance: neither one knows which of the two he is. They are 
not exactly alike. One lives on top of the tallest mountain and throws 
down manna; the other lives on top of the coldest mountain and throws 
down thunderbolts. Neither one knows whether he lives on the tallest 
mountain or on the coldest mountain; nor whether he throws manna 
or thunderbolts. (Lewis 1979: 520–521)
From Lewis, who endorses feature (1), we thus get the following ar-
1 What does it mean for a proposition to have an ‘invariable truth-value’? In 
the present context, it is supposed to capture that propositions are such that they 
are generally true in a given possible world. In this way, propositions are not 
‘relativised’ with respect to a given possible world. Accordingly, the Doctrine’s 
propositions can be true in one world and false in another, but they cannot be 
true in one part of a possible world (e.g. for Alpha) and false in another part 
of the same possible world (e.g. for Beta). Perry and Castañeda include further 
features as characteristic of the Doctrine, which make the feature of invariability 
stronger and more explicit. For the present purposes of analysing the concept 
of self-ascription, these additional ones are not relevant since the main target is 
feature (2).
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gument against the Doctrine: We want to be able to distinguish be-
tween de se beliefs and non-de se beliefs. If belief is a relation between 
a subject and a truth-conditional propositional object, then we can-
not draw this distinction. This is because there are de se beliefs and 
non-de se beliefs which the Doctrine analyses as relations to the same 
proposition despite being distinct beliefs. To illustrate this: If Alpha 
believes I am standing, the (singular) proposition she is related to in 
believing is <that Alpha is standing>. The alternative first-personal 
proposition <that I am standing> is not available for the Doctrine, 
because is does not come with an invariable truth-value in the re-
quired sense. If Alpha entertains that first-personal proposition, it 
is true iff Alpha is standing and if Beta is entertaining it, it is true 
iff Beta is standing. Hence, the truth-value of such a first-personal 
proposition is variable—it might be true in Alpha’s case and false in 
Beta’s. The problem is that, if Alpha entertains the non-de se belief 
Alpha is standing, she is also related to the (singular) proposition <that 
Alpha is standing>. We are thus left with two distinct beliefs which 
are analysed as a relation to the same object. And since the proposi-
tional object of belief is the only individuating feature of beliefs, we 
have two distinct beliefs which cannot be distinguished within the 
Doctrine. Hence, the Doctrine is false. This does not imply that all 
theories of propositional content are incapable of solving the prob-
lem of de se beliefs and hence false. For instance, Perry defends a 
two-dimensionalist solution where he distinguishes between belief 
state and propositional belief content in a fashion similar to Kaplan’s 
(1989) distinction between character and content.
2 The property theory and the necessity of self-ascription
As an alternative to the propositional strategy, Lewis offers us a solu-
tion to the problem which contains two elements. First, there is the 
semantic aspect which concerns the nature of the objects of beliefs. He 
proposes that the objects of beliefs are properties, understood as sets 
of possible individuals (Lewis 1979: 515). Accordingly, the property 
‘standing’ is the set of all standing individuals and the property ‘be-
ing such that a is F’ is the set of all the individuals which inhabit a 
possible world where a is F. So, while the Doctrine took propositions 
to be the objects of beliefs, Lewis defends a ‘Property Theory of 
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Content’ in arguing that we should exchange them with properties.2
The obvious first question is whether such a move is capable of 
reproducing the logical role that propositions played within the Doc-
trine. Lewis thinks it does and defends two essential theses concern-
ing the relation between properties and propositions:
(I) There corresponds a property to every proposition.
(II) There are some properties to which there correspond no 
propositions.
Thesis (I) together with feature (1) entails that every individuation 
of beliefs in terms of propositions can be equally successfully done 
in terms of properties. If we understand propositions coarsely truth-
conditionally, e.g. as sets of possible worlds (cf. Lewis 1979: 515), 
then they can ‘cut’ logical space only along possible world borders—
just like the Doctrine’s propositions. The proposition <that Alpha is 
standing> throws all possible worlds into either of two baskets. The 
ones where it is true are thrown into the ‘true’ basket and the others 
into the ‘false’ basket. But since Lewis is so liberal about the nature 
of properties, he can gerrymander a property that corresponds to 
every such proposition.3 In the case of the proposition <that Alpha is 
standing>, we can use the property that is possessed by every indi-
vidual in a world where it is true, namely ‘inhabiting a world where 
Alpha is standing’ or ‘being such that Alpha is standing’. This prop-
erty similarly throws things into one of two baskets. But this time 
it refers to individuals and not possible worlds and the two baskets 
are labelled ‘instantiates F’ and ‘does not instantiate F’. In the end, 
things will end up in the same baskets for every corresponding prop-
erty–proposition pair because every individual which instantiates F 
2 Such a theory is also independently elaborated and defended by Chisholm 
(1981) and has recently been revived by Feit (2008, 2012). The differences be-
tween these theories are marginal and insignificant for the present discussion 
since they all struggle with the concept of self-ascription.
3 Lewis being an extreme liberalist with regard to properties also manifests 
itself in his On the Plurality of Worlds, where he writes that ‘the abundant properties 
may be as extrinsic, as gruesomely gerrymandered, as miscellaneously disjunc-
tive, as you please. They pay no heed to the qualitative joints, but carve things up 
every which way’ (Lewis 1986: 56).
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also inhabits a world where the relevant proposition is true and vice 
versa. Hence, properties are capable of playing this logical role of the 
Doctrine’s propositions.
Thesis (II) together with feature (1) entails that some individua-
tions of beliefs in terms of properties cannot be equally successfully 
done in terms of propositions. In other words: properties can ‘cut’ 
up logical space in a more fine-grained way than propositions. For 
instance, while everyone in this world has the property of ‘being 
such that Alpha is standing’, only some individuals in this world have 
the property of ‘standing’ (e.g. Alpha, lamps, tables, etc.). So, there 
are some properties that can distribute things into our two logical 
baskets in ways that are not available to the Doctrine’s propositions. 
This implies that it is possible to logically differentiate in a more fine-
grained way using properties than it would be possible using proposi-
tions. This is not a particularly surprising result since properties are 
generally such that they need not be instantiated in every individual 
of a given possible world. On the other hand, the Doctrine’s proposi-
tions are such that they are true for every individual of a given pos-
sible world.
Lewis can therefore support his negative argument against the 
Doctrine with the positive argument for the Property Theory: The 
Doctrine’s propositions are coarsely truth-functional, hence their 
truth-value does not differ within possible worlds. Properties, on 
the other hand, are not generally instantiated in every individual of 
a given world, hence their instantiation may differ within possible 
worlds. Thus, properties can differentiate in a more fine-grained 
way than propositions. As we saw before, de se beliefs require a more 
fine-grained individuation that is unavailable within the Doctrine. In 
contrast, the Property Theory provides the tools for such an individ-
uation. If Alpha believes I am standing, she is related to the property 
‘standing’ whereas if she believes Alpha is standing, she is related to 
the distinct property ‘being such that Alpha is standing’. And hence, 
the Property Theory can solve our problem.
This sounds as if the semantic move from propositions to prop-
erties is enough to solve our problem. However, we can argue that 
this semantic aspect of the Property Theory is incapable of solving 
the problem on its own because the semantic aspect is insufficient for 
drawing all the necessary distinctions we are interested in. It is true 
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that we can distinguish between Alpha’s belief I am standing and her 
belief Alpha is standing using property content—something that was 
not possible within the Doctrine. While the first belief has the prop-
erty ‘standing’ as its content, the second has the property ‘being such 
that Alpha is standing’ as its content. But this alone does not suffice 
to clearly distinguish de se beliefs from non-de se beliefs in general.
Let me explain: Lewis accepts that we want to analyse the dis-
tinction between believing de dicto and believing de se. The seman-
tic aspect tells us that believing de dicto amounts to being related to 
a property such as ‘being such that a is F’ whereas believing de se 
amounts to being related to the property ‘F’. But this semantic dif-
ference does not yet account for the specific features of de se beliefs. 
In either case the subject is related to a property of some kind. But 
what makes the former de dicto and the latter de se? Why is it that 
Alpha believes of herself in the de se way that she is standing if the ob-
ject of her belief is the simple property ‘standing’? And why is it that 
Alpha does not believe of herself in the de se way that she is standing 
if the object of her belief is the more complex property ‘being such 
that Alpha is standing’? There is of course the intuitive appeal of the 
idea that believing I am standing amounts to me simply being related 
to the property ‘standing’. But intuitions are not arguments, so the 
Property Theory needs additional support.
Presumably, the Property Theorist would want to pin down the 
reason in the nature of these specific kinds of properties which the 
subject is related to in believing. The general idea behind this rescue 
attempt is that some properties individuate on the level of individu-
als and others on the level of possible worlds. So, in some cases we 
have a property that picks out a set of possible worlds, and in other 
cases a property that picks out individuals and cuts through possible 
worlds. Simple properties such as ‘standing’ are of the latter kind. 
Since they pick out individuals, the subject is able to locate herself 
in logical space on the level of individuals. Accordingly, having such 
a property as the object of one’s belief results in a de se belief. More 
complex properties such as ‘being such that Alpha is standing’ are 
such that they pick out possible worlds. As such, the subject is only 
able to locate herself in logical space on the level of possible worlds. 
This is the problem that the two gods are facing. Hence, having such 
a property as the object of one’s belief is insufficient for making the 
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belief de se. The resulting proposal is that subjects entertain genuine 
de se beliefs iff they are related to a property which individuates on 
the level of individuals.
So far, so good. Now, consider the difference between believing 
Beta is happy and believing I am such that Beta is happy. Admittedly, 
the latter is a strange belief to have, but it nonetheless seems to be 
a genuine de se belief. After all, it is typically expressed in language 
using the first-person pronoun and would be reported in indirect 
speech using the quasi-indicator ‘she*’ (Castañeda 1966).4 And it also 
seems reasonable to hold that the former is not a de se belief. If that 
is correct, then the semantics of the former ought to differ from the 
semantics of the latter, if we want to generally distinguish de se be-
liefs from de dicto beliefs on the basis of their content. However, the 
Property Theory tells us that the content of the de se belief I am such 
that Beta is happy is the property ‘being such that Beta is happy’—the 
same property which is the content of the de dicto belief Beta is happy. 
But then again we have two beliefs with the same property content 
that ought to be distinct. Therefore, the semantic aspect alone can-
not account for the distinction between believing de dicto and believ-
ing de se. We need something more.5
At this stage then, the Property Theory is only marginally better 
off than the Doctrine. This is where the second element of Lewis’s 
solution kicks in—the epistemic aspect. Lewis argues that the relation 
4 Bermúdez (1998: 3) writes: ‘This is the sort of self-reference whose natural 
linguistic expression is the first-person pronoun “I”, because one cannot use the 
first-person pronoun without knowing that one is thinking about oneself’. This 
indicates the general de se status of belief reports involving the first-person pro-
noun. Furthermore, the de se belief I am such that Beta is happy should be reported 
in indirect speech with the use of the quasi-indicator ‘she*’ while the non-de se 
belief Beta is happy can only be reported with the use of the regular pronoun ‘she’ 
such as in the sentence ‘Alpha believes that she is such that Beta is happy’. This is 
because she self-ascribes a property without having self-knowledge. This clarifi-
cation was thankfully suggested by an anonymous reviewer.
5 The Property Theorist might object that we can still distinguish the natures 
of these properties using my earlier proposal. In the de se case, the property ‘be-
ing such that Beta is happy’ individuates on the level of individuals whereas in the 
de dicto case it individuates on the level of possible worlds. However, such a move 
would severly beg the question for it remains mysterious why these two identical 
properties individuate in different ways in different contexts.
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between a subject and a content in believing de se is that of self-as-
cription. Accordingly, subjects self-ascribe properties when they en-
tertain de se beliefs.6 First off, we need to distinguish self-ascription 
from the more general garden-variety way of ascribing something 
de re to an individual. When a subject believes I am F, she believes 
something of herself in the special characteristic first-person way of 
de se beliefs by self-ascribing ‘F’. On the other hand, when a subject 
believes a is F, she ascribes a property ‘F’ to an individual ‘a’. In 
the case of self-ascription we are dealing with a two-place relation 
between a subject and a property. In contrast, de re ascription is a 
three-place relation between a subject, an individual and a property. 
It is important to note that self-ascription cannot just be the special 
case of ascription where the individual ‘a’ is identical to the ascrib-
ing subject. Alpha can ascribe the property ‘standing’ de re to herself 
without ipso facto believing that she herself is standing—i.e. without 
self-ascribing the property ‘standing’.
Is there more that we can say about the concept of self-ascription? 
Surprisingly, Lewis has very few illuminating things to say about 
self-ascription. There are only a few passages where something like 
an explication is provided. Let us look at two of them:
We can and we do have beliefs whereby we locate ourselves in ordi-
nary time and space; whereby we self-ascribe properties that don’t cor-
respond to propositions; and whereby we identify ourselves as members of 
subpopulations whose boundaries don’t follow the borders of the worlds. 
(Lewis 1979: 519; italics mine)
Wishing that cyanoacrylate dissolved in acetone is wishing to have the prop-
erty of inhabiting a world where it does. (Lewis 1979: 529; italics mine)
As we can see, Lewis is extremely elusive on the details with regard 
to the work that self-ascription is supposed to do and how exactly 
we are supposed to analyse the concept of self-ascription. According 
6 The label ‘epistemic’ points to the connection between the relation of self-
ascription between a subject and a content and the possibility of self-knowledge. 
A subject can know that she herself is F (in the de se way) on the basis of her self-
ascribing the property F. This epistemic aspect of Lewis’s theory has thus far been 
largely overlooked (some recent exceptions are Cappelen and Dever 2013; Holton 
2015; Liao 2012).
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to theses passages, it either involves an identification as a member of 
some group (i.e. the one whose members have the property in ques-
tion), or the belief of having a specific property, or taking oneself to 
have some property.7
The result from the argument above was that the semantic aspect 
alone is incapable of solving our problem, because merely standing 
in a relation to a property instead of a proposition in no way enables 
us to clearly distinguish between de se beliefs and non-de se beliefs. 
In believing Alpha is standing and I am standing Alpha might be related 
to a property in both cases, but that does not help us because being 
related to either of these properties does not account for the first-
person way of thinking characteristic of de se beliefs. From this we 
concluded that it must be the concept of self-ascription that does the 
work.8 However, in order to understand the work that self-ascrip-
tion is doing, we need to have a clear grasp of the concept in play. 
Unfortunately, Lewis himself does not illuminate the concept in any 
way, so we have to do it for him.
However, before discussing three different interpretations of self-
ascription, it is important to note that Property Theorists generally 
take all beliefs to be ultimately de se in nature. So, when Alpha be-
lieves I am standing, she self-ascribes the property ‘standing’ which 
is tantamount to a de se belief. And when she believes Alpha is stand-
ing, she self-ascribes the property ‘being such that Alpha is standing’ 
which again is a de se belief since it consists in the self-ascription of a 
property. The motivation for this move is to obtain a uniform treat-
ment of the belief relation and to avoid distinguishing between the 
relation of self-ascription in the case of de se beliefs and some other 
7 Feit (2008: 16–17) provides a restatement of these points without providing 
a further elucidating analysis: ‘I shall use the term “self-ascription” for the rela-
tion between subjects and the properties that they believe themselves to have. 
(…) The self-ascription relation is in an important sense necessarily reflexive. To 
self-ascribe a property is to ascribe it to yourself and not to any other thing. (…) So 
it is impossible for one person to [self-ascribe] a property to somebody else’. Also, 
there is a further passage at the end of Lewis’s paper which discusses the concept 
of self-ascription. I will discuss this passage in more detail in section 4.
8 Holton (2015: 400) provides a similar but less forceful argument. Cappelen 
and Dever (2013: Chapter 5) provide a different argument to the same conclusion 
based on other semantic considerations.
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relation for other beliefs. The principal worry about this general re-
duction to the de se is that it fails to do justice to the characteristic 
epistemic features of (genuine) de se beliefs. For instance, in virtue of 
her de se belief I am in pain, Alpha presumably is in a position to know 
that she is in pain. This is not the case for de dicto beliefs. In virtue 
of her belief Beta is happy, Alpha is neither in a position to know that 
Beta is happy nor that she is such that Beta is happy—which is one 
and the same thing—despite her presumably self-ascribing the prop-
erty ‘being such that Beta is happy’. We will see this problem resur-
face in the discussion of some of the interpretations of self-ascription 
below.
3 The regress problem
The first and seemingly obvious interpretation of the passages above 
is the following. A subject self-ascribes ‘F’ iff she identifies herself 
with a certain subpopulation of individuals which are F. Identifying 
oneself in this way amounts to believing something of oneself in the 
first-person way—i.e. believing to be a member of a group. If Al-
pha believes I am standing then she identifies herself with the group 
of standing things. And this again amounts to her believing I am a 
member of the group of standing things. It is rather obvious that such an 
interpretation of the concept of self-ascription is hopeless. For, if we 
interpret the relevant passages as involving such a new de se belief, 
then we are lead into an infinite regress:
(1) Every de se belief of the form I am F involves self-ascription of 
some property ‘F’.
(2) Self-ascription of ‘F’ amounts to identifying oneself as a 
member of a subpopulation of things which are F.
(3) Identifying oneself as a member of a subpopulation of things 
which are F is a de se belief of the form I am F*.
(4) Hence, it involves self-ascription of ‘F*’.
(5) …
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We can immediately see that the simple self-ascription of ‘F’ would 
require the subject to self-ascribe infinitely many properties of 
greater and greater complexity. This is an undesirable result. So, 
Lewis’s concept of self-ascription should not imply that an additional 
de se belief is required for the self-ascription to go through. If that 
were the case, we would simply shift our problem to the next level 
ad infinitum. Hence, the argument shows that our first interpreta-
tion of self-ascription fails and we need to reject premise (2) as the 
most straight-forward interpretation of what Lewis has in mind. 
Self-ascription does not require the subject to identify herself with a 
subpopulation by way of a de se belief of the form I am a member of the 
group of F-things.
4 The irreducibility problem
The second interpretation follows a common understanding of Lew-
is’s position. The source of this interpretation is a small passage at the 
end of the paper where Lewis claims that self-ascription is ‘ascription 
of properties to oneself under the relation of identity’ (Lewis 1979: 
543). What it means for a subject to self-ascribe a property is for her 
to ascribe a property de re to herself under the relation of identity. It 
seems that he is here invoking a kind of reduction of self-ascription to 
de re ascription. This sounds initially promising because we already 
have a grasp on what it means for a subject to ascribe a property de re 
to an individual and self-ascription would then just be a special form 
of ascription under certain conditions.
The condition that Lewis has in mind is that the ascription is made 
‘under the relation of identity’. He thus proposes the two-part inter-
pretation that self-ascription can be explained by invoking the notion 
of a de re belief about oneself together with the relation of identity. 
Now what does it mean for a subject to ascribe a property ‘under the 
relation of identity’? First off, we are faced with an obvious problem. 
We already saw in section 2 that the mere identity of ascribing subject 
and ascribed individual does not result in a self-ascription since the 
subject can ascribe ‘F’ de re to herself without ipso facto having a de se 
belief of the form I am F despite the fact that the ascribing subject and 
the de re ascribed individual are identical. So what else could Lewis 
have had in mind? We can use this first observation to distinguish 
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between a weak and strong reading of the identity conditions:
Weak reading       
Any instance of self-ascription implies that the ascribing individ-
ual is identical to the ascribed individual.
Strong reading       
Self-ascription can be analysed in terms of ascription to oneself 
under certain conditions.
I already dismissed the weak reading which is echoed in Chisholm’s 
definition of direct attribution—his term for self-ascription: ‘For ev-
ery x, every y and every z, if x directly attributes z to y, then x is 
identical with y’ (Chisholm 1981: 28). As such, it does not tell us 
anything new about self-ascription since we already knew that in the 
case of de se beliefs, the ascribing subject is necessarily identical with 
the ascribed individual. That is what it is to have a de se belief. So, 
the weak reading cannot provide us with anything new in order to 
explain self-ascription.
However, on the strong reading we are confronted with a kind 
of reduction of self-ascription to de re ascription which clearly goes 
beyond a statement of the necessary identity involved in the weak 
reading. Let me first explain why the strong reading actually fits in 
nicely with Lewis’s claim that the de re subsumes the de se, and that 
self-ascription is definable in terms of ascription of properties ‘under 
the relation of identity’. In the final paragraphs of ‘Attitudes De Dicto 
and De Se’, he explores the relation between the de re and the de se 
and argues:
So belief de se falls under belief de re. But there are other relations of 
acquaintance, besides identity, that a subject may bear to himself. So 
belief de re about oneself turns out to cover more than self-ascription of 
properties. To take an example due to David Kaplan, watching is a rela-
tion of acquaintance. I watch myself in reflecting glass, unaware that I 
am watching myself. I ascribe to myself, under the description ‘the one 
I am watching,’ the property of wearing pants that are on fire. I there-
fore believe de re of the one I am watching—that is, myself—that his 
pants are on fire. But I do not self-ascribe the property of wearing pants 
that are on fire. Very soon I will, but not yet. So self-ascription isn’t 
quite the same thing as ascription, de re, to oneself. (Lewis 1979: 543)
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It is clear that Lewis is after a reduction of the form: ‘A subject 
S self-ascribes a property F iff S ascribes F de re to S under condi-
tions C’. However, it is still an open question which conditions C are 
needed to complete the reduction. On the basis of the quote we can 
distinguish at least two main readings of the conditions that need to 
be examined:
Strong+ reading      
Self-ascription requires ascription to oneself paired with the as-
sumption of identity between ascribing and ascribed individual.
Strong– reading      
Self-ascription requires ascription to oneself paired with the de 
facto identity of ascribing and ascribed individual.
The problem with the strong+ reading is that it is epistemically un-
sound. It should not be necessary for the believing subject to think 
something along the lines of I ascribe the property F to the individual a 
under the assumption that a is identical to me. In such a belief the subject 
would have to identify an individual and attribute identity to that 
individual. So, if self-ascription involved the assumption of identity, 
we would have a belief which involved the identification of an indi-
vidual. However, such an account of self-ascription would clash with 
the mere possibility of de se beliefs that exhibit ‘immunity to error 
through misidentification’ (Evans 1982; Shoemaker 1968).
There is a considerable amount of debate about the nature and 
pervasiveness of immunity (cf. Prosser and Récanati 2012). How-
ever, despite the differing opinions, any suitable explanation of de 
se beliefs must be able to account at least for the possibility of their 
immunity—even if one disagrees about the pervasiveness of the phe-
nomenon. A plausible reason why some beliefs are immune to error 
through misidentification is that they do not involve an identifica-
tion at all. Alpha cannot misidentify the individual she is thinking 
about—i.e. herself—in believing I am F because she does not iden-
tify an individual at all. In contrast, beliefs which are subject to iden-
tification failure are not identification-free. Alpha might misidentify 
Beta in her belief Beta is F since who she takes to be Beta is in fact 
someone else.
However, the strong+ reading epistemically involves such an 
Unauthenticated
Download Date | 3/12/18 10:09 PM
Florian L. Wüstholz414
identification because the subject has to assume that whoever she 
is ascribing F to is identical to herself. But if that were correct, she 
could fail to identify the right individual and thus her de se belief 
would not be immune to misidentification. Her epistemic basis in-
volves some stance on the identity of the individual. The following 
argument makes this reasoning explicit:
(1) De se beliefs might exhibit immunity.
(2) If a belief exhibits immunity, it does not involve an identifica-
tion element.
(3) De se beliefs involve self-ascription of properties.
(4) Self-ascription of properties is de re ascription of properties to 
oneself under the assumption of identity between ascribing 
and ascribed individual.
(5) Ascription of properties to oneself under the assumption of 
identity involves an identification element.
(6) Therefore, de se beliefs involve an identification element.
(7) Therefore, de se beliefs cannot exhibit immunity.
The strong+ reading should be distinguished from the more subtle 
and plausible reading according to which the epistemic basis of a self-
ascription is such that no question of identity arises. For instance, in 
introspection, the subject has to take the property to be instantiated 
by herself—for otherwise it would not be a case of introspection. 
But such a judgement does not involve an assumption of identity since 
the subject does not take an explicit stance on the identity of the indi-
vidual.9 We can thus conclude that the strong+ reading is too strong 
and thus out of the question.10
9 Such an account of self-ascription is the basis of the primitive account hinted 
at in section 5 and should be seen as a natural advancement of the Lewisian the-
ory. An anonymous reviewer has helped me to formulate this in clearer terms.
10 In fact, Holton (2015: 406) seems to take Lewis’s account to imply such 
an interpretation: ‘If this account is to work, every case of de re belief must be a 
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Does the strong– reading fare any better? Sadly, our problem 
cannot be solved by assuming that de se ascription is a specific form 
of de re ascription paired with the de facto identity of ascribing and 
ascribed individual. As we already saw, the Property Theory entails 
that any subject having any kind of belief already entertains a de se 
belief and must, therefore, ascribe a property to oneself ‘under the 
relation of identity’. The fact that a subject ascribes a specific prop-
erty to herself under the relation of identity thus cannot explain why 
some beliefs are de se and others are not.
This echoes the general worry that the reduction of all beliefs to 
the de se threatens to undermine the special epistemic qualities of 
de se beliefs. As we saw, there is a crucial difference between Alpha 
believing I am F and her believing Alpha is F. If every kind of belief 
is ultimately de se, this difference remains mysterious. The original 
suggestion that self-ascription can distinguish between these fun-
damentally different kinds of belief would collapse on this picture 
because everything would be a self-ascription of a property. Hence, 
the nature of genuine de se beliefs cannot be accounted for by the 
strong– reading as the following argument shows:
(1) All beliefs are de se beliefs.
(2) De se beliefs are self-ascriptions of properties.
(3) Self-ascriptions of properties are ascriptions of properties to 
oneself paired with the de facto identity of ascribing and as-
cribed individual.
(4) Hence, all beliefs involve ascription of properties to oneself paired 
with the de facto identity of ascribing and ascribed individual.
case in which the subject self-ascribes a particular unique relation to the thing in 
question, that is, to the res. But why should we think that that is so? Could not 
a subject have a belief about the res without having any belief about the relation 
they bear to it?’ The question is, of course, rhetorical. There is no reason to think 
that a de se belief requires the subject to hold a belief (of any kind) concerning 
the kind of relation it stands in with the object of her belief. Worse still, such a 
consequence would render the explanation of self-ascription circular again since 
it would involve a new de se belief on the part of the subject concerning the kind 
of acquaintance relation she herself stands in.
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(5) Hence, de facto standing in a relation of identity to oneself 
cannot account for the difference between de re ascription 
and self-ascription.
There is an additional oddity in the strong– reading. Let us suppose 
that self-ascription can be accounted for by separating the de re as-
cription to oneself on the one hand from the acquaintance relation 
of identity to oneself on the other. If we think about the epistemic 
nature of genuine de se beliefs, it is puzzling how this two-fold pro-
posal is supposed to help. The first-person way of thinking that is 
characteristic of genuine de se beliefs is not exhausted nor character-
ised by the particular relation a subject stands in to herself—without 
assuming to stand in such a relation; for otherwise we would be hav-
ing circularity troubles again. The identity relation belongs to the 
basis of de se beliefs and should not be assumed by the subject.11 This 
defect troubles both versions of the strong reading for they are both 
reductive in nature. A reduction of the type ‘A subject S self-ascribes 
a property F iff S ascribes F de re to S under conditions C’ is therefore 
hopeless.12
Let us sum up the discussion of the second interpretation of Lew-
is’s concept of self-ascription. The idea was that self-ascription can 
be analysed in terms of de re ascription to oneself ‘under the relation 
of identity’. There are two ways to initially interpret this proposal. 
On the weak reading, it merely spells out a logical consequence of 
11 This observation is similar to one by John Campbell in his Past, Space, and Self 
(1994: 84). Reasoning from ‘I am F’ and ‘I am G’ to ‘I am both F and G’ is possible 
without judging that the ‘I’ in the first judgment and the ‘I’ in the second judge-
ment are identical. In Campbell’s words, our reasoning ‘trades on identity’. If such 
an identity judgement were necessary, we would be lead into an infinite regress.
12 Both the regress problem and the irreducibility problem are somewhat re-
lated to a recent argument by Simon Prosser (2015) which he also calls a regress 
argument. Prosser argues that proper de se beliefs ultimately require ‘first-person 
redundant representations’—a special first-personal way of representing (say) a 
proposition. Any purely de re ascription of a property or a relation to a subject 
would fail to account for characteristic features of de se beliefs if they were not 
based on a first-person redundant representation. Interestingly, he also notes 
the similarities of these arguments to arguments concerning a looming infinite 
regress in the first person by Ryle (1949: 186–189) and Merleau-Ponty (1962: 
104–105).
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self-ascription without providing an analysis in some other terms. 
We saw that this reading brings nothing new to the table. On the 
strong reading, we should analyse self-ascription in terms of de re 
ascription to oneself under some conditions. I distinguished two 
different versions of this strong reading. On the strong+ reading, 
self-ascription involves the epistemic assumption on the part of the 
subject of an identity relation between the ascribing subject and the 
ascribed individual. But, as my argument showed, such a reading 
is impossible because it is epistemically unsound. On the strong– 
reading, we distinguish de se beliefs from others by invoking the 
acquaintance relation of identity that we de facto stand in. So, on 
the strong– reading, self-ascription could be reduced to the con-
cept of de re ascription. However, my arguments showed that such 
an analysis fails as well, since it is incapable of solving our problem. 
If all beliefs are de se beliefs—as the Property Theory takes them to 
be—then we always stand in the relation of identity to ourselves in 
entertaining beliefs. Therefore, that relation in itself cannot account 
for the difference between de re believing of oneself to be happy and 
de se believing of oneself to be happy. Hence, none of the proposed 
readings so far can account for our problem.
5 The primitiveness of self-ascription
There is a final interpretation of Lewis’s concept of self-ascription 
available. The lessons we learned from the other two interpretations 
are that self-ascription needs to be capable of drawing the distinction 
between genuine de se beliefs on the one hand and non-de se beliefs on 
the other. Furthermore, a reduction of self-ascription to de re ascrip-
tion is not possible. Instead, the new suggestion is that self-ascription 
is primitive and constitutes the first-person way of believing some-
thing of oneself in the de se way. Recently, Shen-yi Liao has argued 
that a primitive interpretation of self-ascription is the only one that 
solves our problem and thus should most plausibly be attributed to 
Lewis:
On this account, the identification of centres [of possible worlds] and 
the individuation of possible individuals are primitive, unable to be elu-
cidated through other non-trivial features. (…) [T]his mystery is to 
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be expected given the main lesson from the problem of essential in-
dexicals: the de se cannot be reduced to the de dicto. There is something 
special about learning who oneself is that cannot be captured in learning 
about what features one possesses, even if that list of features is exhaus-
tive. (Liao 2012: 313–314)
The suggestion of Liao is that any reductive account of self-ascription 
requires a non-primitive individuation of a given individual which 
runs us into the problems we encountered above. The only alterna-
tive is that self-ascription consists in a primitive individuation of a 
possible individual. Such an individuation is distinct from an iden-
tification of an individual in that it does not require a certain set 
of conditions to be fulfilled and does not import the possibility for 
misidentification.
There is additional support for the primitive interpretation in a 
passage by Chisholm (1981: 29) where he discusses the notion of di-
rect attribution—his equivalent for self-ascription. He suggests that 
the most basic relation that subjects can stand in with regard to the 
contents of their attitudes is that of ‘considering oneself as having a 
certain property’. This is the rock bottom relation that is required to 
have any beliefs at all, and we may call that most basic relation ‘direct 
attribution’ or ‘self-ascription’.
So, the primitive interpretation seems to give us the following: 
whenever we have a de se belief, we consider ourselves as having some 
property or other. However, we simply cannot analyse the notion 
‘considering ourselves as having’ in more fundamental terms with-
out giving a circular explanation (cf. Frank 1986; Lailach-Hennrich 
2011). This can be illustrated using our second interpretation above. 
The suggestion was that self-ascription is to be analysed as ascrip-
tion de re to oneself under conditions C. Accordingly, a subject self-
ascribes ‘F’ iff she ascribes ‘F’ de re to herself under conditions C. 
But we can then ask: How does the subject know that conditions C 
are fulfilled other than by way of a further self-ascription? If self-
ascription is to play the role of providing an explanation of the nature 
of the de se, it better not require de se beliefs in the first place. Hence, 
any attempt to reductively explain self-ascription is bound to fail.
Furthermore, the primitive interpretation chimes in well with 
the arguments already presented for the necessity of self-ascription 
for a solution of our problem. And Holton (2015: 403) provides us 
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with a further argument that is supposed to show that only primitive 
self-ascription—and not some reductive variant—can provide a so-
lution and that we cannot reduce it to or explain it in terms of some 
other concept:
We normally think of ascription as a two-place relation: one ascribes 
a property to a thing. Self-ascription would then be the special case 
where the thing is the self. But that won’t do the work here. If the self 
is just thought of extensionally, then we would have no way to distin-
guish the belief that one’s pants were on fire from the belief that the 
pants of someone, who is you though you don’t realize it, are on fire. 
(…) So we have to think of self-ascription as a one-place relation: one 
simply self-ascribes a property.13
Holton’s point echoes the above remarks. De se beliefs require some 
primitive non-identificational relation to the self-ascribed properties. 
Otherwise, we can always ask the question: How does the subject 
know that she herself is F? Even if the relevant property is as detailed 
as you want, there is always the possibility of believing of someone to 
have that property without de se believing oneself to have it.
It is important to note that the irreducibility of self-ascription 
does not make the concept mysterious. It is perfectly possible to give 
a non-reductive explanation of self-ascription in terms of other con-
cepts. There are two important desiderata for such an account of 
primitive self-ascription. On the one hand, it has to do justice to 
the fact that de se beliefs involve some primitive individuation of an 
individual to which the property is self-ascribed. On the other hand, 
this kind of individuation has to be essentially first-personal in order 
to result in a de se belief.
How could such a non-reductive account look like? A mere sketch 
will have to suffice for the moment. We could understand subjects as 
engaging with the world through their lived body (cf. Husserl 1973; 
Merleau-Ponty 1962). This would involve some very primitive grasp 
on the part of the subject concerning the question: Which parts of 
the body are under one’s immediate control and are means of direct 
13 In section 2 I characterised self-ascription as a two-place relation and de re 
ascription as a three-place relation, whereas Holton thinks that self-ascription is 
a one-place and ascription a two-place relation. This is only a terminological dif-
ference and has no substantial consequences.
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interaction with the world? A primitive self-ascription could then be 
understood as an ascription to the lived body. This could satisfy the 
two desiderata in the following way. Since the lived body is simply 
the body ‘we find ourselves in’, it is not necessary to identify one-
self with a certain individual. And our way of engagement with the 
world through the lived body gives that phenomenological body a 
privileged first-personal epistemic position. Of course, this rough 
sketch would have to be developed in more detail in order to do full 
justice to the phenomenon of de se thinking.
6 Conclusion
The concept of self-ascription plays a crucial role for understanding 
the nature of de se beliefs. Originally, the term was introduced into 
the debate by Lewis in his elaboration of the Property Theory of con-
tent. I argued that the mere semantic move from propositions to prop-
erties fails to solve the problem of de se beliefs. While properties are 
more fine-grained than propositions, it is still possible to have distinct 
beliefs with identical contents. Thus, the solution has to lie in the 
special epistemic relation of self-ascription. A closer inspection of the 
concept of self-ascription then uncovered several problems. If taken at 
face value, the explanation of self-ascription ends with an infinite re-
gress. The more common two-fold interpretation according to which 
we need to distinguish the de re ascription of the property to oneself 
from the acquaintance relation of identity under which that ascrip-
tion happens also failed. Depending on the exact reading of this two-
fold approach it is either epistemically unsound or just as incapable of 
drawing the distinction between de se and non-de se beliefs as a purely 
semantic approach. I then argued that we have to understand self-as-
cription as a primitive epistemic relation. This result—and the argu-
ments provided in favour of it—is not only relevant to proponents or 
friends of the Property Theory. The necessity of a primitive epistemic 
relation between subjects and the objects of their de se beliefs remains, 
even if we (say) advocate a propositional theory of content.14
14 This paper has benefitted greatly from comments by Christopher Pea-
cocke, Gianfranco Soldati, Johannes Brandl, Pascale Anna Lötscher, Patrik 
Engisch, Davor Bodrozic, and an anonymous reviewer, for which I express my 
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